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The American Law Institute (ALI) has undertaken the task of
drafting the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. This en-
deavor is in its early stages. As the Reporters charged with the re-
sponsibility of drafting the black letter rules and comments, we have
understandable constraints on what can be said about the project
until it is released to the public. The work of the ALI involves a
complex process of consultation and critique by a broad range of
constituencies, review by the ALI Council, and finally, approval by
the membership. This Article should not and will not serve as a
sneak preview of the ultimate work product. Nonetheless, without
delving into detail it is possible to paint in broad strokes the goals
that we set for ourselves when we undertook this endeavor and the
reasons why we believe that a carefully crafted and sensibly stated
restatement of the law of products liability can help settle the trou-
bled waters of tort litigation.
I. THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
In 1963, when William Prosser undertook the drafting of section
402A of the Second Restatement, he stood at the precipice of a new
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era in tort litigation.' Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 2 had bro-
ken the privity barrier for actions against manufacturers based on
implied warranty.3 For the first time, the entire distributive chain
was available as defendants without the necessity of resorting to
negligence.4 Under the new doctrine, if the defendant was the seller
of a defective product and the plaintiff could prove causation, a
prima facie liability case was fully established. 5 Prosser understood
that the Uniform Commercial Code was an inept tool with which to
prosecute tort-based cases. 6 It carried too much baggage. Its stat-
ute of limitations, 7 notice requirements, 8 and rules regarding dis-
claimers 9 were strangely out of place in classic tort litigation. A new
lexicon was necessary to free the courts not only from the shackles
of the Uniform Commercial Code, but also from rigid no-duty con-
1. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 791, 793-94
(1966) [hereinafter Prosser, The Fall] (arguing that turning point in products liability revolu-
tion occurred in 1960, setting off "the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an
established rule in the entire history of the law of torts").
2. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
3. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80-81 (NJ. 1960) (acknowl-
edging common law rule permitting action for breach of warranty only by contracting party
but declaring that modern systems of product distribution render privity rule invalid as
against public policy); see also Prosser, The Fall, supra note 1, at 791 (stating that Henningsen
signaled "fall of the citadel of privity"). Henningsen was the final blow in an assault that began
in 1916, whenJudge Cardozo reasoned that manufacturers owed a duty of care to third-party
consumers. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) ("If the
nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in danger when
negligently made, it is then a thing of danger."); William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel,
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, The Assault] (explaining that MacPherson
eliminated privity rule with respect to "inherently" or "imminently" dangerous chattels).
4. See Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 84 (holding that manufacture and marketing of product
creates implied warranty that product is suitable for intended use); see also Prosser, The Fall,
supra note 1, at 793 (observing that Henningsen imposed liability without considering fault of
manufacturer).
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A cmt. f (1977) ("The rule... applies to
any manufacturer... [and] to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor."); see also FrankJ.
Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers, Wholesalers, and Distributors of Defective Products, 12
NOVA L. REV. 213, 218 (1987) (noting that majority of states hold retailer liable notwithstand-
ing facts that retailer is not responsible for creating defect and reasonable inspection failed to
disclose defect).
6. See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 3, at 1134 (observing that construing tort claims in
contractual terms is circuitous and unnecessary); cf. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 1, at 801-02
(asserting that although U.C.C. might be amended to provide for direct liability, broad-based
standard of § 402A obviates such action by eliminating references to contract altogether).
7. See U.C.C. § 2-725 (1987) (prescribing four-year statute of limitations for breach of
sales contract actions).
8. Compare Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 899-900 (Cal. 1962)
(holding that although notice is useful in actions for breach of contract, notice is not required
in tort claims where injured consumer was not in privity with manufacturer) with U.C.C. § 2-
607(3)(a) (1987) (requiring buyer to notify seller of breach within reasonable time period).
9. Compare Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 87-95 (NJ. 1960) (dis-
cussing contract law pertaining to warranties and determining that where seller has dispro-
portionate bargaining power over buyer, public policy dictates that implied warranty should
not be subject to waiver) with U.C.C. § 2-316 (1987) (permitting seller to exclude implied
warranties by terms of sales contract).
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cepts that stood as a barrier to legitimate liability claims.' 0 Creativ-
ity would be necessary to confront the new problems that would
arise in a privity-free world of litigation.
Prosser adopted the term "strict liability in tort" as the anthem
for the revolution." The phrase did, indeed, serve as a liberating
force. When faced with obstacles to recovery such as nonliability to
bystanders,1 2 the "intended use" doctrine,1' the "patent danger"
rule,' 4 and difficult evidentiary problems,1 5 courts concluded that
these doctrines had no place in the new world of "strict tort
liability."16
There can be little argument that section 402A was a bold initia-
tive. It holds the record as the most frequently cited restatement
10. Cf. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 3, at 1100 (asserting that most important reversal
of nonliability to parties not in privity was MacPherson's extension of duty of care to any party
"who might be expected to use" product); Prosser, The Fall, supra note 1, at 802 (explaining
that concept of "warranty" was last link between traditional contract liability and strict liabil-
ity); see also infra notes 12-14 (discussing obstacles to recovery, including no liability to by-
standers, intended use doctrine, and no duty to design against obvious dangers).
11. See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 3, at 1134 ("If there is to be strict liability in tort,
let there be strict liability in tort, declared outright, without an illusory contract mask.").
12. See, e.g., Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (refusing to grant
strict liability claim of injured bystander in traffic accident); Kuschy v. Norris, 206 A.2d 275,
276 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1964) (denying benefit of implied warranty to third party killed in
traffic accident); Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
(requiring that injured party be user of defective product rather than bystander to recover on
basis of implied warranty), cert. denied, 141 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1962).
13. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir.) (reasoning that
"X-body" design of automobile was irrelevant to liability determination because collision is
not automobile's intended use), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), overruled by Huff v. White
Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109-10 (7th Cir. 1977).
14. See, e.g., Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291, 292 (2d Cir.) (following patent
danger rule, which holds that no duty exists for manufacturers to design against obvious dan-
gers), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959); Farmhand, Inc. v. Brandies, 327 So. 2d 76, 80-82 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (refusing to impose liability for injury resulting from design hazard that
would be obvious to ordinary user); Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 803 (N.Y. 1950)
("[T]he manufacturer of a machine or any other article dangerous because of the way in which
it functions, and patently so, owes to those who use it a duty merely to make it free from latent
defects and concealed dangers."), overruled by Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y.
1976).
15. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin Marietta Corp., 418 F. Supp. 837, 844-46 (W.D. Okla. 1975)
(requiring plaintiff to establish that product was defective when manufactured, that defect
rendered product unsafe for intended use, and that defective product was proximate cause of
injury), aff'd, 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976); Curtiss v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 511 P.2d
991, 996-97 (Wash. 1973) (allocating to plaintiff burden of showing that product was defec-
tive at time of manufacture).
16. See Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109-10 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that
"intended use" of vehicle includes unintended but reasonably foreseeable incidents of use,
such as traffic accidents); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 88-89 (Cal. 1969)
(granting protection to injured bystanders on rationale that bystander has even less control
over instrumentality than does purchaser or user); Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657,
659-60 (Colo. 1980) (limiting plaintiff's burden of proof to showing that product was defec-
tive at time of purchase); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 576-78 (N.Y. 1976) (re-
jecting patent danger rule as encouraging manufacturers to design outrageously hazardous
products, as long as hazard is obvious).
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section,' 7 and its widespread acceptance by the courts speaks for
itself. That record notwithstanding, Prosser could not and did not
foresee in 1963 the broad range of problems that would arise in a
fully developed system of products liability. For the most part, sec-
tion 402A focused on manufacturing defects.-8 In the early 1960s,
litigation based on defective product design was in its infancy. A
host of no-duty defenses blocked such actions,19 and section 402A
paid little attention to the problem. 20 Even litigation based on fail-
ure to warn had not yet come into full bloom.2' American consumer
safety consciousness was relatively undeveloped and consumer ex-
pectations were not sufficiently high to fuel an aggressive litigation
posture.
As litigation began to move from the idiosyncratic manufacturing
defect to generic defects, section 402A was called on to resolve
problems that it had not addressed. 22 In one sense the genius of the
drafting permitted broad interpretive gloss. The term "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous" was marvelously flexible.23 A
17. See Letter from Marianne M. Walker, A.L.I. Restatement Case Citations Editor, to
James A. Henderson and Aaron D. Twerski, Reporters, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability (Oct. 11, 1991) (on file with authors) ("In my nine years with American Law Institute I
have found Section 402A to be the most frequently cited section of any Restatement."). As of
March 15, 1993, § 402A had been cited in 3156 cases. Search of LEXIS, States library, Mega
file (Mar. 15, 1993).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1977) (explaining that rule of
strict liability applies "where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a (defec-
tive] condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dan-
gerous to him [or her]").
19. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing defenses of nonliability to
bystanders, intended use doctrine, and patent danger rule).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1977) ("If the injury results
from abnormal handling... the seller is not liable."); id. cmt. g (noting that "the burden of
proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time it left the hands of a particular
seller is on the injured plaintiff"); id. cmt. i (explaining that product is defective only if "dan-
gerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community").
21. See id cmt. j (requiring reasonable warning on products that may be unreasonably
hazardous if misused). In general, even early in the product liability era a manufacturer or
supplier had a duty to warn users or consumers that a defect may have existed and to explain
procedures or precautions necessary to avoid harm. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American Presi-
dent Lines, Ltd., 345 F. Supp. 395, 400 (N.D. Cal. 1971); see also Gonzalez v. Virginia-Carolina
Chem. Co., 239 F. Supp. 567, 571 (E.D.S.C. 1965) (reasoning that manufacturer owes duty to
test for hazardous propensities and to warn of such danger).
22. See James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1527 n.9 (1992) (listing 14 types of
issues not contemplated by § 402A that courts had to confront in post-402A era).
23. See Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 233 (Cal. 1982) (permitting
finding of defective condition based on plaintiff's use of product, circumstances of injury, and
product's objective safety features); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1025 (Pa.
1978) (reasoning that Restatement term "unreasonably dangerous" has "no independent sig-
nificance and merely represents a label to be used when it is determined that the risk of loss
should be placed upon the [negligent] supplier"). These decisions may be blamed in part on
the failure of the Restatement to adopt its definition of "defect" in a way that reflects an
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court could utilize whichever test for defect it saw fit and find au-
thority for its position in the black letter law.2 4 Comments g, h, i,
and j to section 402A were wonderfully vague. Like the Oracle at
Delphi whose prophecies could not be found wanting, section 402A
meant all things to all persons. If in the context of generic defect
"strict liability" was something less than strict, so be it. As long as
some aspects of the generic defect litigation might not be fully con-
gruent with classic negligence doctrine, there was no harm in adopt-
ing the "strict liability" term to describe the new phenomenon.2 5
We believe that the cost to the American judicial system of the
babble of language resulting from attempts to establish a single defi-
nition that would cover all forms of defect has been unacceptably
high. It has spawned needless confusion and fear.2 6 The actual
holdings of the courts have by and large been eminently sensible.
We hope that it will be possible to capture the essence of those deci-
sions in language that will fairly portray a broad-based consensus.
The reality is that doctrine has taken a back seat to a pragmatic and
functional approach to the issue of defect. A new restatement
should reflect that pragmatism. It will go a long way to settling
troubled waters. An accurate portrayal of the subtlety and common
sense of the common law can assist in soothing and mitigating the
"crisis-like" atmosphere that has become so pervasive.
II. DEFINING THE ISSUES
A new restatement will undoubtedly take positions on some of the
controversial issues. But an equally important role will be its defini-
evolving consensus among state courts. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 22, at 1528-29 &
n.15.
24. For example, states that advocate risk-utility balancing as the test for defect, see, e.g.,
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 961 (Md. 1976) (stating that design defect in
some circumstances depends on balancing utility of design and other factors against magni-
tude of risk); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682 (W. Va. 1979)
(stating that risk-utility analysis in tort product liability sets general contours of relevant ex-
pert testimony concerning defectiveness of product), and those that advocate the consumer
expectation test, see, e.g., Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 70 (Neb. 1987) (noting
that law of product liability is evolving toward acceptance of risk-utility test), rely on § 402A as
the font of authority.
25. See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 558 (Cal. 1991)
(noting that strict liability doctrine has incorporated some well-settled rules from law of negli-
gence and survived judicial challenges asserting such incorporation violates fundamental
principles of doctrine); Owens-Illinois, Inc., v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 640 n.7 (Md. 1992)
(stating that despite overlap of negligence principles in strict liability failure to warn case,
strict liability differs because contributory negligence is not defense to strict liability claim).
26. See Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: A
Mirror Crack'd, 25 GONz. L. REv. 205, 218 (1989-1990) (suggesting that diversity of ap-
proaches taken by courts in product liability litigation results from confusion over possible
definitions of "defect" under § 402A).
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tion of the problems that have plagued difficult areas of the law.2 7 A
27. For example, we have identified a number of issues for which § 402A did not provide
an adequate solution. It is our hope to address many of those issues in the Restatement
(Third). We believe that the following issues deserve treatment:
(1) Liability for lessors, commercial builders, franchisors, etc. See, e.g., Harris v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 550 F. Supp. 1024, 1026-28 (W.D. Va. 1982) (extending implied warranty princi-
ple to franchisor that promoted, but did not manufacture or sell product); Cintrone v. Hertz
Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 775 (N.J. 1965) (finding liability for breach of
implied warranty where product was leased, not sold); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207
A.2d 314, 323 (NJ. 1965) (imposing liability on builder for injury resulting from defect in
construction of house).
(2) The problems of damage assessment arising from enhanced injury cases. See, e.g., Hud-
dell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1976) (placing burden on plaintiff to establish
extent of enhancement of injury in crashworthiness case). Contra Lahocki v. Contee Sand &
Gravel Co., Inc., 398 A.2d 490, 501 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (noting that plaintiff need only
prove enhancement of injury to shift apportionment of damages burden to defendant).
(3) Liability in cases involving sale of used products. See, e.g., Crandell v. Harkin & Jones
Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31, 34 (S.D. 1983) (holding strictly liable used products merchant
who rebuilt or reconditioned goods).
(4) The difficulty in drawing a line between sales and services. See, e.g., Murphy v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247, 249-52 (Cal. 1985) (holding pharmacist who merely filled
prescription for apparently safe drug immune from strict liability); Magrine v. Krasnica, 227
A.2d 539, 547 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967) (refusing to apply strict liability to dentist
where patient was injured by defective hypodermic needle), aff'd sub nor. Magrine v. Spector,
241 A.2d 637 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aft'd, 250 A.2d 129 (NJ. 1969).
(5) The difficulties of working out the relationship between comparative fault and strict tort
liability. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, Beloit Power Sys., Inc., 610 F.2d 149, 154-63
(3d Cir. 1979) (discussing effect of plaintiff's fault on recovery in strict tort liability and con-
cluding that, in jurisdiction governed by appropriate comparative negligence statute, recovery
in strict liability should be reduced "in proportion to the plaintiff's causal contribution to his
[or her] own injury").
(6) The problems related to recognizing a cause of action for mental distress arising from
products-related injuries. See, e.g., Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 448 N.E.2d 1332, 1334-36
(N.Y. 1983) (reasoning that where dentist's mental condition prevented him from working
after defendant's product caused death of patient, plaintiff could recover for loss of business
but not for emotional distress); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 174-81 (Mass. 1982)
(reasoning that to recover from DES manufacturer for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, plaintiff must show causation in form of physical injury rather than mere statistical
probability of future injury).
(7) The difficulties in deciding which forms of product-related economic loss were to be cov-
ered by products liability law and which were to be governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code. See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-76
(1986) (holding that where only loss claimed is economic, plaintiff's ability to recover benefit
of bargain through contract claim overrides any benefit that would accrue from action in strict
liability).
(8) Whether there is a duty to warn of scientifically unknowable or unforeseeable risks. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 552-59 (Cal. 1991) (discuss-
ing state-of-the-art defense and concluding that manufacturer's actual or constructive knowl-
edge of defect is prerequisite to strict liability for failure to warn); Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546-49 (N.J. 1982) (reasoning that state-of-the-art defense is
grounded in negligence theory, but where action is in strict liability and manulacturer's culpa-
bility is not in issue, state of the art is irrelevant).
(9) The complex interaction between design defect and failure to warn. See, e.g., Uloth v. City
Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978) (refusing to permit manufacturer to dis-
charge responsibility for designing safe product by merely providing warning about unsafe
product's hazardous nature).
(10) Whether strict liability will attach even if manufacturer met state of the art standards
extant at the time of manufacture. See, e.g., Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d
743, 746 (Tex. 1980) (stating that defective design must be judged relative to state of the art
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restatement is, however, not primary authority. Courts are free to
disagree with restatement positions and do so with considerable fre-
quency. Whatever positions it takes, however, a restatement can, by
its formulation of black letter law and explanatory comments, pro-
vide the courts with crisp and unmuddled formulations of legal
problems.
One area where such problem clarification is sorely needed will
serve to demonstrate how a new restatement can provide the courts
with a clear policy choice. One of the most oft-cited comments to
section 402A deals with "unavoidably unsafe" products.28 Com-
ment k sets forth the following guidelines for dealing with this spe-
cial genre of products:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their in-
tended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the
field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pas-
teur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very se-
rious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the
disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the market-
ing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding
the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a
product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper direc-
tions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably danger-
ous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like,
many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to
physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true
in particular of many new and experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical ex-
perience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of
purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recog-
nizable risk. The seller of such products again with the qualifica-
tion that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held
to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use,
merely because he [or she] has undertaken to supply the public
with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk.2 9
at time of manufacture, but that plaintiff may rebut defense by showing availability of econom-
ically feasible and safer alternative design).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1977) (addressing unavoidably
unsafe products); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 22, at 1536 n.38 (observing that "[a]lmost
all jurisdictions pay some allegiance to comment k").
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1977).
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This most important comment30 has befuddled courts and schol-
ars alike. Does it address the issues of drug warnings or drug de-
sign? If it speaks to the issue of defective drug design, how do drug
cases differ from nondrug design claims? To answer that question,
one searches in vain in the restatement comments for a clear liability
standard for nondrug design cases. Comments g and i do appear to
adopt a consumer expectation test for liability, but it is very unclear
as to whether that definition of defect was intended to cover design
defect claims.3' How then, can comment k create an exception to
strict liability for drug design when the restatement has not ex-
plained the ordinary standard for design liability?
It is again unclear whether comment k speaks to warnings. The
discussion in the comment that exempts new and experimental
drugs from strict liability seems to be saying that there is no liability
for failure to warn against unknown and unforeseeable risks. Does that
mean that in nondrug cases strict liability imposes a duty to warn of
unknown and unforeseeable risks? Comment j, which discusses
warnings, seems to belie that thesis. 32 Comment k appears to be
internally inconsistent because it concludes that an exemption from
strict liability applies only when known risks are warned against.33
Whether liability attaches for unknown and unforeseeable risks is
unclear.
It is high time that this confusion come to an end. First, a new
restatement must address the question of whether liability should
attach for failure to warn about unforeseeable risks both for drug-
and nondrug-related products. Second, a new restatement must di-
rectly confront the standard of liability for nondrug design cases.
Third, having set the parameters for liability in the nondrug arena, a
new restatement must tackle the difficult question of whether drug
design review is an appropriate subject for the courts.
The overwhelming majority of cases brought against prescription
drug manufacturers have been brought on failure-to-warn
30. For an extensive discussion of the authorities who have written about this comment,
see Henderson & Twerski, supra note 22, at 1536-45.
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1977) (stating that defect exists
where product is "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer"); id. cmt. i
("The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer.").
32. See id. cmt.j (asserting duty to warn if seller "has knowledge, or by the application of
reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge" of danger inherent
in product).
33. SeeJoseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment A and for Strict Tort
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853, 868-69 (1983) (highlighting internal inconsistencies in com-
ment k, such as known-risk exception apparently covered by comment i, and experimental-
drugs-with-unknown-risk exception that would be irrelevant because participants in drug tri-
als give informed consent).
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grounds.3 4 Design defect claims against prescription drug manufac-
turers have been rare.3 5 If a drug brings a particular therapeutic
benefit to some patients that cannot be provided by another drug, it
should not be declared defective in design.3 6 The drug manufac-
turer clearly has a duty to warn and alert physicians to the danger-
ous propensities of the drug so that it not be used when a safer
alternative is available.37 But to declare the design defective would
unfairly deny some patients the benefits of a drug that is an effective
part of their treatment. 38 No sensible advocate would promote such
a policy. Drug design cases have surfaced, however, asserting the
claim that the challenged design provides no therapeutic advantage
over existing drugs and subjects users to needless additional risk.3 9
34. See, e.g., Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that in
case of experimental drug, manufacturer must advise that product is experimental and must
warn of all known or probable risks); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988)
(interpreting comment j as conditioning manufacturer's liability on actual or constructive
knowledge of hazard at time of sale); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 374 N.E.2d 683, 686 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978) (concluding that manufacturer or seller has duty to warn only "when it knows
or should have known" of hazard, and that interpreting commentj otherwise would be "in-
congruous"), aff'd, 402 N.E.2d 194 (Ill. 1980); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388
N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that duty to warn under comment k does not
attach unless actual or constructive knowledge can be imputed to manufacturer).
35. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 22, at 1542-43 (asserting that courts have based
liability on failure to warn "[a]lmost without exception"). But see, e.g., Heath v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 722 P.2d 410, 413 (Colo. 1986) (permitting claim of design defect in pharma-
ceutical case); Lindquist v. Ayerst Lab., Inc., 607 P.2d 1339, 1349 (Kan. 1980) (allowing
recovery for design defect where manufacturer failed to properly test drug).
36. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that
decision to apply comment k exception must be case-by-case determination based on societal
need for product and availability of safer alternatives); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d
374, 383 (N.J. 1984) (rejecting blanket comment k exception for prescription drugs in favor of
inquiry into feasibility of safe alternatives); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d
775, 781 (R.I. 1988) (basing determination of comment k exception on risk/utility analysis,
including availability of alternatives). But see McDaniel v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 241 N.W.2d 822,
828 (Neb. 1976) (asserting that absent showing of manufacturer's bad faith in obtaining ap-
proval, FDA approval of drug constitutes comment k immunity); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.,
813 P.2d 89, 96 (Utah 1991) (reasoning that FDA approval process establishes elements of
comment k immunity).
37. The general rule for prescription drugs requires that a warning be given only to the
physician, as a learned intermediary. See, e.g., Anderson v. McNeilab, Inc., 831 F.2d 92, 93
(5th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that manufacturer of prescription drug discharges duty to warn by
informing doctors of potential harmful side effects of drug); Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
721 F. Supp. 89, 95 (D. Md. 1989) (applying learned intermediary rule to instance involving
manufacturer's duty to warn consumer); Polley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 658 F. Supp. 420, 421-22
(D. Alaska 1987) (reasoning that learned intermediary rule applies where physician can best
judge patients' likely reaction to potentially harmful drug).
38. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1977) (observing that although
certain products may possess dangerous propensities, they are otherwise so beneficial as to be
judged dangerous but not defective, as matter of policy).
39. See, e.g., Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 310-11 (Idaho 1987) (suggesting that
comment k analysis is similar to negligence analysis in that both look to potential benefit,
realized benefit, and availability of alternatives); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 382-
83 (N.J. 1984) (refusing to grant blanket immunity under comment k where safer alternative
products are available).
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These cases demand a decision as to whether design defect claims
should be allowed.
Those who advocate design review for drugs argue that such
claims are valid and deserve to be litigated under the rubric of clas-
sic design defect principles. 40 Those opposed believe that design
review of drugs involves the courts in second-guessing the Food and
Drug Administration. 41 Opponents argue further that when a drug
presents a gratuitous risk, a manufacturer can be held liable for fail-
ing to warn about the needless risk that the drug presents. 42 A new
restatement should confront this issue and set clear guidelines. We
are hopeful that courts will adopt the position ultimately taken by
the ALI. Whether they agree or disagree, however, the issue will
have been clarified and the courts will have a clear policy choice to
make.
III. THE COST OF CLARIFICATION
Clarifying the law has obvious benefits. To the extent that a re-
statement rings true and is adopted by the courts, not only does the
law become more comprehensible, but precious time that is now
spent litigating and relitigating issues around which there is broad
consensus is saved. In the absence of a clearly stated consensus
rule, parties cannot judge the merits of their cases reliably and tend
to engage in strategic behavior, maximizing perceived weaknesses in
the opposition's position to resolve cases by settlement on terms
most favorable to their own positions. The existence of a consensus
is not always clearly discernible. Linguistic differences between dif-
ferent judicial opinions may give the impression of dissension when
in reality such dissension is only facially significant.
Although all may agree in the abstract that clarity is a desidera-
40. See, e.g., Frank M. McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion
Through the Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 32, 34
(1978) (arguing that permitting design defect claims would protect consumers' interests and
that in practice, defects in design, manufacture, and warning tend to merge).
41. See, e.g., John P. Reilly, The Erosion of Comment h, 14 U. DAYTON L REV. 255, 256
(1989) (arguing that FDA approval establishes rebuttable presumption that product's benefits
outweigh its risks); Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: The Meaning and Policy Be-
hind Comment h, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1142-43 (1985) (contending that good-faith
compliance with FDA approval procedures ensures that manufacturer will exercise care neces-
sary to establish product's safety for prescribed use); Sidway H. Willig, The Comment k Charac-
ter: A Conceptual Barrier to Strict Liability, 29 MERCER L. REV. 545, 562 (1978) (asserting that
although noncompliance with regulatory measures may create separate cause of action for
fraud, compliance with drug approval process creates presumption of comment k immunity).
42. See Schwartz, supra note 41, at 1142-43 (asserting that manufacturer who fails to in-
form FDA of all potential risks attendant to use of drug should face compound liability); Wil-
lig, supra note 41, at 562 (suggesting that failure to disclose fully all risks in regulatory
proceeding should permit additional action for fraudulent misrepresentation).
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turn, there may be considerable sympathy and nostalgia for the stud-
ied ambiguity of section 402A.43 The confusion may be viewed as a
positive good allowing for a more leisurely development of the law,
even if it is relatively clear what the ultimate rule is destined to be.
We believe that most of the law that has developed around products
liability makes good common sense. Rules and doctrines that are
sensible should not be frightening or daunting, and sharp contro-
versy need not send shock waves to those on either side of a conflict.
In the long run, confusion is far more disturbing to those who must
conform their behavior to a set of norms than is a standard of con-
duct that sets firm but understandable rules. The dark of the night
sends shivers down the spines of those who must find their way
without a compass. Admittedly, the heat of the sun may cause some
discomfort. But there is a vast difference between fear and
discomfort.
If the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability can remove the
fear of the night and replace it with sunlight, it will contribute to a
greater consensus and to a world of more rational debate. Both
objectives will serve to mute the inflammatory rhetoric that has
characterized discussions over the fairness of tort litigation.
43. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (discussing inherent flexibility in inter-
pretation of § 402A).
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